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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.
BRENT JACKSON, RAQUEL NIELSEN
AND PATRICIA E. SMITH,

:
:
:
:
:
:

Case No. 950696-CA
(consolidated cases)
Category No. 2

Defendants and Appellants. :
AMENDED BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS1

JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Jurisdictional authority is conferred upon the Utah Court of
Appeals pursuant to §78-2a-3(2) (f) , Utah Code Annotated (1953, as
amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Is the affidavit submitted in support of the search

warrant lacking a substantial basis for issuance of a warrant, and
therefore, fatally flawed?
II.

Does the Utah Constitution protect Utah citizens'

reasonable expectation of privacy in residential trash placed in a
city-provided container and left at the edge of the city street for
pickup?

Pursuant to stipulation of Frederic J. Voros, Jr. Assistant Utah Attorney
General, this amended brief replaces the original brief of appellants, filed
with this Court on the 31st day of July, 1996.

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, RULES, ETC.
United States Constitution, Fourth Amendment.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Constitution of Utah, Article I, Section 14.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is from the trial court's final Judgment of
conviction entered on the 10th day of October, 1995.

Defendants

further appeal from the trial court's denial of their Motion to
Suppress Evidence, which denial was included in the trial court's
Ruling On Defendants' Motion To Suppress entered on the 23rd day of
March, 1995.

Defendants' Notice of Appeal was filed in the trial

court on the 18th day of October, 1995.
In the early morning hours of the 8th day of June of 1994,
Sergeant Jerry Harper, of the Provo City Police Department searched
two trash receptacles placed in the street for collection in front
of the Defendants' home. According to the affidavit in support of
the requested warrant, the officer identified no reason for the
search of the trash cans.

He did, however, mention two previous

2

incidents involving the residents: 1) approximately 36 days prior
to the search of the trash receptacles, one of the residents had
pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana and paraphernalia [the
underlying offense giving rise to such guilty plea was committed on
15 January, 1993 - 509 days prior to presentment of the affidavit
to the magistrate] and 2) approximately 56 days prior to the search
of the receptacles, the residents were victims of an aggravated
burglary and aggravated robbery in which several men forced their
way into Defendants' home and held them captive while demanding
money and drugs.
Based on the results of the search conducted by Sergeant
Harper an affidavit was prepared and submitted to a magistrate.
The magistrate issued a search warrant also on the 8th day of June
shortly before noon. It authorized a day time search and a "noknock" entry. The warrant was executed shortly before 5:00 p.m. on
the 8th of June, 1994.

Various items of controlled substances and

paraphernalia were discovered in the home and seized. Each of the
three defendants was charged with possession of controlled
substances and paraphernalia.

Defendants filed their written

Motion to Suppress Evidence seeking a ruling from the trial court
that the subject search warrant was improperly issued.

Oral

argument on such motion was heard on February 7, 1995.

The trial

court issued its ruling denying the motion on the 23rd day of
March, 1995.

Defendants subsequently entered conditional pleas of

guilty on the 14th day of August, 1995, to an Amended Information
3

alleging two counts, to wit:

possession of marijuana in a drug

free zone, a class A misdemeanor, and possession of drug
paraphernalia in a drug free zone, also a class A misdemeanor,
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
There did not exist a substantial basis for the magistrate to
have issued the search warrant under an analysis based on the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or under
an analysis based on Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution.

The evidence of certain statements of the Defendants

which were included in the affidavit filed in support of the search
warrant were improperly included in the affidavit and should have
been redacted from the affidavit and not considered by the trial
court in reviewing the validity of the search warrant.
The Constitution of Utah recognizes as reasonable Defendants'
expectation of privacy in the contents of their residential garbage
containers left at curbside for collection by the municipal garbage
department.

The

evidence obtained by the police officers pursuant

to a warrantless search of Defendants' residential garbage
containers, prior to the issuance of the subject search warrant,
should have been ruled illegally obtained; that evidence obtained
from the warrantless garbage container search should therefore have
been redacted from the affidavit and not considered by the trial
court in reviewing the validity of the search warrant.

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I
The affidavit submitted in support of the search
warrant lacked a substantial basis for issuance
of a warrant, and is therefore, fatally flawed
A.

Standard of Review
The United States Supreme Court has adopted a "totality of the

circumstances" test to determine if a magistrate properly found
probable cause to issue a search warrant.2 In so holding the Court
directed that "[a] magistrate's 'determination of probable cause
should be paid great deference by reviewing courts.'"3 "'A grudging
or negative attitude by reviewing courts toward warrants,! is
inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for
searches conducted pursuant to a warrant; 'courts should not
invalidate warrant[s] by interpreting affidavit[s] in a hyper
technical, rather than a common sense, manner.'"4
While the United States Supreme Court has required that an
affidavit provide only a "substantial basis for ... concluding that
a search warrant would uncover evidence of wrongdoing", and that
"[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common sense decision whether, given all the
circumstances set forth in the affidavit before him, ... there is a

2

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).

3

Gates, above, citing Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969).

4

Gates, above, citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102 (1965).

5

fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be
found in a particular placet,]" the Court also stressed that "[i]n
order to ensure that ... an abdication of a magistrate's duty does
not occur, courts must continue to conscientiously review the
sufficiency of affidavits on which warrants are issued."

5

The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was made applicable to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.6 The Utah Supreme
Court has recognized this review-of-warrants test articulated by
the United States Supreme Court.7
B.

Insubstantial basis for issuance of the warrant
For the following reasons, the affidavit in this case did not

provide the magistrate with a substantial basis to conclude that
contraband or evidence of a crime would be found in the residence
located at 1033 West 770 South, Provo, Utah.
1)

Irrelevant paragraphs

The Utah Court of Appeals has held that information that does
not aid the magistrate in his probable cause determination is
irrelevant in a review of whether the warrant was properly issued.6
Paragraphs 1., 2., 3., 4., 9., 10., 11., and 12. do not provide for

Gates, above.
6

Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).

7

State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1983); State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d
1099 (Utah 1985); State v. Babbell, 770 P.2d 987 (1989); State v. Thurman, 846
P.2d 1256.
e

State v Potter, 860 P.2d 952 (Ut. App., 1993).

6

a probable cause determination and are, therefore, irrelevant to
any review of whether the warrant was properly issued.
Paragraph 1. sets out the affiant's police training and
experience. Nothing in this paragraph directly helped the
magistrate determine if contraband would probably be in the subject
residence. Defendants concede that, indirectly, the officer's
experience in the recognition of marijuana stems and seeds would
have aided the magistrate's determination of the nature of
substances found in their residential garbage container. Defendants
will argue below, however, that the mere existence of such
substances in their residential garbage container, on the street,
did not establish a fair probability that the same substances would
be found in their residence.
Paragraphs 2. and 3. give no clue as to why one should
conclude that drugs would probably be in this residence.
Paragraphs 4. details Provo City's system of residential
garbage service. As with paragraph 1., it does not directly provide
probable cause for the existence of contraband in the house. And,
as with paragraph 1., this paragraph may have provided the
magistrate with some insight into the connection of a garbage
container to the subject residence, but again, Defendants will
argue below that existence of illegal substances in the garbage
containers did not provide probable cause to believe such
substances would still be in the residence.

7

Paragraphs 9.and 10. are generic or canned statements of the
affiant's experience with other drug users and provided the
magistrate with no information that evidence of illegal activity
would probably be found in the subject residence. Paragraph 11.
simply describes the exterior of the residence. Paragraph 12.
recites the affiant's subjective expectations. Neither of these two
paragraphs would have aided the magistrate in his probable cause
determination.
Paragraphs 1., 2., 3., 4., 9., 10., 11., and 12. cannot be
construed to establish probable cause that evidence of criminal
activity would be found in Defendants' house. If this warrant is to
stand, it must be on the strength of the totality of paragraphs 5.,
6 ., 7 ., and 8.
2)

Staleness

Facts set out in an affidavit which are stale are likewise
irrelevant to the magistrate's probable cause determination. Facts
are stale "when a significant lapse of time occurs between the
discovery of the information suggesting that evidence of the crime
can be found at a particular locale and the magistrate's finding of
probable cause or the execution of the warrant. The concern is
whether so much time has passed that there is no longer probable
cause to believe that the evidence is still at the targeted
locale."9

Paragraphs 2., 3., 4., 5., 6., 7., and 8. of the

9

State v Hansen. 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987); State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256
(Utah 1993) .

8

affidavit provided the magistrate with stale facts that could not
support the warrant.
a)

Staleness of "evidence" within the garbage container

Paragraphs 4., 5., 6., 7., and 8, of the affidavit establish
that the affiant searched through the contents of two garbage
containers, each marked "1033" corresponding with the street
address of the subject house and each situated on the street in
front of the subject residence. Paragraph 4. recites that the
residential garbage containers in Provo are set on the street once
a week for pick up by a city truck. Paragraphs 6., 7., and 8.
detail how the affiant found small ("user") amounts of marijuana
and paraphernalia in the can and that the containers also had trash
directly associated with Pat Smith and Brent Jackson.
With this information and assuming that the two cans were
routinely placed on the street for collection each week, the
magistrate could conclude - at best - only that the marijuana and
paraphernalia found in them were discarded no more than 1 week
prior. But since the affidavit contained no information that the
affiant had watched the two containers to determine when they had
last been emptied by Provo City trucks, the assumption that the
trash within them had been discarded from the residence within the
week immediately prior cannot be fairly made. It is equally
rational to conclude that this residence's garbage was not taken to
the street on a weekly basis, either because of habit, neglect, an

9

intervening vacation, or several other logical reasons. Without
information as to the most recent time the containers had been
collected, the magistrate had no basis to determine the "age" of
the garbage, he could only guess as to how long the trash had been
in them, and by extension how recently contraband may have been in
the residence. On its face, the affidavit does not establish
whether contraband would have been in the residence 1 week prior, 2
weeks prior, 8 weeks prior, 6 months prior, etc.

The information

in these paragraphs is stale and cannot be a basis for the issuance
of a warrant.
b)

Staleness of evidence of prior bad acts

Similarly, paragraphs 2. and 3. contain stale information
having no application to the magistrate's probable cause
determination. Besides providing no facts from which to conclude
contraband was probably in the residence, the information in these
two paragraphs concerns occurrences that were 56 and 509 days old
respectively. Utah appellate courts have found such remote facts to
be totally useless in the probable cause determination.10 This
reviewing court should likewise rule that the information from
these two paragraphs provided the magistrate with no probable cause
for the issuance of the warrant.

State v. Brooks, 849 P.2d 640 (Ut. App., 1993); State v. Viah, 871 P.2d
1030 (Ut. App., 1994).

10

3)

Use of improper information

Paragraph 2. of the supporting affidavit told the magistrate
that armed intruders had entered the subject residence and that
"[a]ccording to Smith and Jackson the men held them captive for
several hours demanding drugs and money. The men wanted to know
where the drugs were."
On 17 May, 1994, 3 weeks prior to the date of the sworn
affidavit, each of these Defendants was granted immunity by the
Utah County Attorney for "any crime disclosed by [their] testimony
arising out of incidents which occurred on April 13, 1994, ..."
The United States Supreme Court has held that if false
information has been knowingly and intentionally or recklessly
included in an affidavit sought to support a search warrant, such
information must be redacted from the affidavit. If the affidavit
then lacks probable cause, the evidence seized pursuant to the
warrant must be suppressed as if the improper information had not
been originally included in the affidavit.11 The Utah Supreme Court
has recognized such a procedure.12 The Utah Supreme Court has
further extended this reasoning to include misstatements which
occur because information is omitted.13

U

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).

12

13

State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 1986).

State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986).

11

In providing the information in paragraph 2., the affiant
failed to advise the magistrate that each Defendant had been
granted immunity in consideration for their testimony involving the
13 April incident. Also omitted from the affidavit was information
that further evidence adduced at the preliminary hearing for the
aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery indicated that the
intruders may have been looking for a man named "Fransisco" who may
have resided in and moved from the same residence before these
Defendants moved into it.
In addition to being stale and of only marginal help to the
magistrate in his probable cause determination, paragraph 2.
recklessly omitted information from the magistrate which would have
established that the statements within the paragraph were
privileged and of even more dubious value than might be facially
apparent. Accordingly, this paragraph should have been excluded
from the affidavit and the warrant should be assessed as if the
affidavit did not originally include this information.
4)

Evidence found in the garbage did not indicate that the
same substances were probably inside the residence

In addition to being stale, the evidence of marijuana and
paraphernalia in the two garbage containers was of only marginal
value in a determination of whether similar items were probably in
the residence.
As stated in paragraph 8., the evidence indicated "possession
of small amounts for use." It was not indicated that inventories
12

for distribution were present or expected. The "stems, seeds," and
"small piece of marijuana," as well as the generally minute
quantities of evidence found in the containers was indicative of
the "dregs" or remnants of a small personal-use amount that had
already been consumed. The nature of the evidence was also
consistent with a small amount that may have, on an isolated
occasion, been brought into the house, used, and the remnants
discarded by a guest. Additionally, because the affiant did not
indicate when the containers were taken to the street, nor that the
containers were kept under surveillance once on the street until
searched, and because once on the street the containers were
accessible to third parties, the contraband could have been placed
in them by strangers or neighbors.
Defendants do not argue that the magistrate's determination of
probable cause must necessarily exclude all other possibilities.
But, the affidavit must establish a "fair probability" that
evidence will be found where it is sought. The conclusion that
contraband was probably still in the house was not supported by
corroborating evidence. From the affidavit it was at least as
likely that contraband in the cans originated with a house guest, a
stranger, or a neighbor. Defendants argue that where, as here, the
evidence points equally to several possibilities, a finding of
probable cause that one of many possibilities is most likely, is
not justified without corroborating evidence.

13

5)

Isolated nature of evidence

Where the affidavit recites a mere isolated violation it
would not be unreasonable to imply that probable cause
dwindles rather quickly with the passage of time.
However, where the affidavit properly recites facts
indicating activity of a protracted and continuous
nature, a course of conduct, the passage of time becomes
less significant. United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285
(10th Cir., 1972) .14
The affidavit recites the one-time presence of a small amount
of contraband indicative of personal use. The affidavit did not
indicate contraband had been found in the same garbage containers
on other dates. No evidence was provided to the magistrate that
contraband probably was in the residence on other occasions.

Taken

in its best light, the affidavit merely recited the presence of a
small amount of contraband in the residence's garbage on one
isolated date. The affidavit did not indicate a protracted pattern
of usage sufficient to postulate that similar substances might
routinely be in the home. Neither did the affidavit establish a
course of conduct consistent with repeated drug use or possession
in the home. The isolated presence of a small amount of contraband
that may have been discarded 1 week, 2 weeks, or more, prior to
discovery by the police has a dwindling probable cause value as an
indicator that contraband may still be in the home.

State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127 (Utah 1987); State v. Strombera, 783 P.2d
54 (Ut. App., 1989); State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284 (Ut. App., 1990); State v.
Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017 (Ut. App., 1993).
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6)

Failure to preserve evidence

Paragraph 6. of the affidavit recites that marijuana and
paraphernalia were found in Defendants1 garbage. It was further
indicated in that paragraph that the marijuana field tested
positive for marijuana. However, the record of this case does not
indicate that the contraband was preserved or made an exhibit to
the affidavit. Consequently, it is impossible for this court to
adequately review the assertion that contraband was found in the
two garbage containers. Where, as in this case, a warrant is based
substantially on the seizure of real evidence, such evidence should
be preserved for the record, first for examination by the issuing
magistrate and ultimately for review by the trial or appellate
court. The failure to preserve the evidence disadvantages the
Defendants and should be a factor considered by this court in
assessing the adequacy of the facts supporting the warrant.
C.

Good Faith exception
The United States Supreme Court has held that evidence

obtained by police officers acting in good faith, objectively and
reasonable relying on a search warrant issued by a neutral and
objective and detached magistrate, should not be excluded even if
the warrant is found to be legally insufficient by reason of lack
of probable cause. 15The Leon Court also noted four exceptions
where good faith will not save an invalid warrant: 1) the warrant

15

U n i t e d S t a t e s v . Leon,

468 U . S . 897
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(1984).

was issued by a magistrate who was misled by false information, 2)
the magistrate abandons his neutral and detached objectivity, 3)
the affidavit is so lacking in probable cause that it is
unreasonable for the officer to rely on it, 4) the warrant is so
facially deficient in describing the place to be searched or the
thing to be seized that the officer cannot legally rely on it.16
If this court should determine that the affidavit lacked
sufficient probable cause to support the issuance of the search
warrant, it should further rule that because the affiant also
served the warrant, he could not ignore the requirement to present
the magistrate with probable cause for the warrant and then claim
that the failure to do so constitutes good faith.17
POINT II
The Utah Constitution protects Utah citizens' reasonable
expectation of privacy in residential trash placed
in a city provided container and left at
the edge of the city street for pickup
A.

Standard of Review
Defendants have found no Utah case which specifically holds

that the standard of review of warrants under Article I, Section 14
of the Utah Constitution is significantly different than the United
States Supreme Court's standard under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The Utah Court of Appeals has stated

Leon, above.
Leon, above; State v. Dronebura, 781 P.2d 1303 (Ut. App., 1989); State
v. Rowe, 806 P.2d 730 (Ut. App., 1991).
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that it considers that the Utah Supreme Court has had ample
opportunity to pronounce a different standard and that because it
l

has not, the prevailing federal standard of review also applies to

any review of the Utah Constitution guarantees against unreasonable
searches and seizures.18 Defendants therefore analyze the issuance
of the warrant in this case, under the Utah Constitution, by
applying the standards set forth in Gates, above.
The Utah Supreme Court recognizes that an exclusionary rule is
proper to insure the guarantees of Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution.19 Therefore, exclusion of all evidence seized
pursuant to the warrant is proper if the warrant is deemed issued
in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah.
B.

The Utah Constitution recognizes Defendants' reasonable
expectation of privacy in their residential garbage
Defendants1 argument, above, that the Fourth Amendment to the

United States Constitution does not support the issuance of the
warrant in this case acknowledges that the United States Supreme
Court has held that the Fourth Amendment allows a warrantless
search of a citizen's garbage left curbside and outside of the
residential curtilage, for the reason that the United States
Supreme Court does not recognize an expectation of privacy in

1S

Salt Lake City v. Truiillo, 854 P.2d 603 (Ut. App., 1993); State v.
Singleton, 854 P.2d 1017 (Ut. App., 1993).
19

State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990); State v Thompson, 810 P.2d
415 (1991).
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garbage so situated.20In contrast, Defendants here argue that
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah does recognize an
expectation of privacy in residential garbage, even when placed
outside the curtilage for collection by the municipal authority.
In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) the United
States Supreme Court developed the two-part test to determine if
one has a reasonable expectation of privacy in a place searched.
First, defendant must assert a subjective expectation of privacy in
the searched area. Second, society must accept such expectation of
privacy as reasonable. Likewise, the Utah Supreme Court has held
that an expectation of privacy is the threshold criterion for
determining if Article I, Section 14 applies.21 Defendants argue
that, unlike the Fourth Amendment, Article I, Section 14 of the
Utah Constitution can be reasonably interpreted to reflect that
Utah society would recognize and accept their expectation of
privacy in their residential garbage left at curbside.
1)

The Utah Constitution can recognize freedoms not
guaranteed by the United States Constitution

A state court may interpret its own constitution in a manner
different from the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of
a similar federal provision,22 so long as it does not reach a

California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988).
21

State v. Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991).

22
Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324
U.S. 117 (1945); Jankovich v. Indiana Toll Road Comm., 379 U.S. 487 (1965).
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result providing its citizens with less rights than those
guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States.23
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "it is imperative that
Utah lawyers brief this Court on relevant state constitutional
questions."24 On several occasions Utah's highest court has shown a
willingness to make substantive law based solely on the Utah
Constitution. See, e.g. American Fork City v. Cosgrove, 701 P.2d
1069 (Utah 1985) (scope of privilege against self-incrimination);
Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984) (automobile guest
statute); State v. Ball, 685 P.2d 515 (Utah 1984) (questioning a
juror about drinking alcohol); Gray v. Employment Security, 681
P.2d 807 (Utah 1984)(Durham, J. concurring and dissenting, due
process in re: unemployment benefits); State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d
460 (Utah 1990) (automobile exception to search warrant); State v.
Thompson, 810 P.2d 415 (Utah 1991) (expectation of privacy in bank
records); Zissi v. State Tax Commission of Utah, 842 P.2d 848 (Utah
1992) (Utah Constitutional exclusionary rule prevents admission of
illegally seized evidence at Commission hearing). On other
occasions the Court has suggested it is inviting argument on Utah
Constitution Article I, Section 14, specifically.25

23

Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984).

24
State v. Hyah, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803
(Utah 1986).
25
State v. Hyah, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985); State v. Earl, 716 P.2d 803
(Utah 1986); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988); Durham, Employing the
Utah Constitution, 2 Utah Bar Journal 25 (Nov., 1989).
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From the above it is clear that Utah's appellate courts have
the authority to interpret Utah's constitutional search and seizure
provisions differently than the corresponding federal provision.
The Utah Supreme Court has invited discussions of Utah
Constitutional principals, has established a history of reaching
them, and, has developed Utah Constitutional law in variance with
federal law. In this context, it is proper for this court to
consider an interpretation of the Utah Constitution which may be
different from the federal constitutional holding. Oregon Justice
Hans Linde has stated: "A lawyer today representing someone who
claims some constitutional protection and who does not argue that
the state constitution provides that protection is skating on the
edge of malpractice."26

It would be equally shortsighted for this

court not to entertain such a state-based argument.
2)

The Utah Constitution can reasonably be interpreted to
recognize an expectation of privacy in one's residential
garbage left at curbside, outside of the curtilage

Defendants argue that the Utah Constitution recognizes an
expectation of privacy in one's residential garbage left at
curbside for collection by a municipal authority, notwithstanding
that the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution does
not. The argument is founded on a) the societal and historical
context of the Utah Constitution, b) the "primacy model", and c)
analogous holdings and reasoning.

Welsh & Collins, Taking State Constitutions Seriously, 14 The Center
Mag. 6, 12 (Sept./Oct. 1981).
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a) Societal and constitutional historical context
It is generally not disputed that Utah's history is unique.
The original (non-native) settlers were literally driven out of
settlements in three other states (primarily for their religious
practices and because of jealousy of their economic successes

and

mistrust of their tight-knit ecclesiastically oriented society)
while governments in the other states at best turned a blind eye to
their banishment and at worst acted with complicity. The settlers
came to the west in an attempt to isolate themselves from
persecution and to create an autonomous society. Their migration to
the great basin was one of the largest mass migrations in the
history of America.28 The initial government of the immigrants was
comprised of the leaders of their religion (The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter Day Saints [Mormons]) until the first of seven
attempts at a constitution was drafted in 1849 (The Constitution of
the State of Deseret) .29

In this portion of this memorandum and in the next succeeding subsection Defendants have borrowed extensively from Kenneth L. Wallentme, Heeding
the Call: Search and Seizure Jurisprudence Under the Utah Constitution, Article
I, Section 14, as well as briefing from previous appellate arguments provided by
Ronald J. Yengich and Hakeem Ishola. Use of information from these works has
been previously approved by Messrs. Wallentme, Yengich, and Ishola. The
assistance and collegiality of these three gentlemen is acknowledged and greatly
appreciated.
Also Society of Separatiomsts v. Whitehead, 870 P.2d 916 (Utah 1993),
provides a similar analysis of Utah's unique history. In this case the Utah
Supreme Court held that because of Utah's unique history a ruling can follow a
different line of analysis than has been used in the federal context.
28

John J. Flynn, Federalism and Viable State Government - The History of
Utah's Constitution, 1966 Utah Law Review 311.
29

Flynn, at 315; see also, Peter Crawley, The constitution of the State of
Deseret, 29 BYU Studies 7 (1989).

21

"[The] Constitution of the State of Deseret was as much a
public relations piece as an application for statehood, a document
designed to show that the traditional political processes were
alive and well in Deseret.

. ..

Although the federal constitution

was the ultimate prototype, there is little doubt that [it] was
derived from the Iowa Constitution of 184 6.ff30 "In many respects
the constitution of 1849 was similar to the Illinois Constitution
of 1818, the constitution the Mormons had lived under in Nauvoo,
Illinois."31 From this first attempt at a written constitution
followed six more attempts in 1856, 1862, 1872 (which used the
Nevada Constitution of 1864 as a model), 1882, 1887, and 1895
(which borrowed heavily from earlier attempts at a Utah
constitution as well as from the Constitutions of Nevada,
Washington, Illinois, and New York). This final draft was approved
by voters on 5 November, 1895. President Grover Cleveland
proclaimed Utah a state on 4 January, 1896.32
Heavily influencing the effort at arriving at a constitution
that would be acceptable both to the inhabitants of the area and
the U.S. Congress was the Mormon church's official pronouncement
embracing the practice of plural marriage (polygamy) in 1852.33 All

Crawley, at 15.
31

32

Flynn, at 315.

Flynn, at 316-325.

Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy cases, 9 Utah Law Review
308 (1964).
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drafting attempts after 1852 were undoubtedly affected by federal
displeasure with such official practice.^4
Official U.S. Congressional attempts to prosecute polygamy
were the Morrill Act of 1862 and the Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1882.35
These Acts were not directed at the riff-raff and disenfranchised.
Rather, "[b]y indicting the [Mormon] Church's leading figures, the
government sought to set a vivid example for rank and file members,
paralyze the Church's leadership, and cow the Mormon populace into
submission to federal policy."'16 The federal plan ultimately worked
- the Church's leadership was cornered into renouncing its
endorsement of polygamy if any hope of statehood was to be
realized. "By 1893, after the Church had renounced polygamy and
prosecutions had largely ceased, there had been 1004 convictions
for unlawful cohabitation and thirty-one for polygamy."^ The 1887
Constitution contained a criminal law punishing polygamy16 and the
Constitution of 1895 included Article III, providing, inter alia,
"polygamous or plural marriages are forever prohibited.",0
Statehood quickly followed in two months.
14

Flynn, at 316.

Firmage, Religion & the Law: The Mormon Experience in the Nineteenth
Century, 12 Cardozo Law Review 765, (1991).
Firmage, at 772.
Firmage, at 775; see also, L. A m n g t o n , Great Basin Kingdom
Economic History of the Latter Day Saints 1830 - 1900, (1958).
38

Flynn, at 320.

39

Constitution of Utah, Article III, First: (1896).
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An

Mormons, a close and self sufficient society, suffered from
organized persecution that was not held in check (and quite
probably was encouraged) by three separate state governments. They
undertook an arduous mass migration over great distances to both
avoid the persecution and maintain their monolithic religious-based
society. Once they arrived here they were made the further target
of almost fifty years of federal pressure because of Congress1
disapproval of their belief in polygamy. Ultimately, before the
citizens of Utah were allowed acceptance into the union, the church
which formed the foundation of their society, was forced to take
the degrading step of publicly denouncing what had been a basic
religious tenet (polygamy).
In this setting, for the fifty years immediately preceding
acceptance into the union, several attempts were made at drafting a
state constitution that would placate Congress. The seventh draft,
prohibiting polygamy, finally secured statehood. The development of
the State's present constitution and the intent of its various
provisions, cannot be assessed without an appreciation of these
dynamics.
Article I, Section 14 (prohibition against unreasonable
searches) was drafted by a people who thrice were not protected by
their local governments from mob violence, who - at the risk of
annihilation - fled to a place of total isolation from other
societies and all governments, who endured ridicule and systematic
federal prosecution of their membership as well as their leaders
24

for a core religious belief (the evidence for such prosecutions plural wives and co-habitants - being harbored in their private
homes), who maintained a public disagreement with the federal
government for five decades, and who were forced to suffer public
humiliation before acceptance by the federal government, would not
have taken lightly the intrusion of those governments into their
persons, houses, papers, and effects.
Article I, Section 14 is a reflection of the people's feelings
of hostility and distrust of a government perceived as inimical to
their beliefs if not their existence. While the people's leaders
had the federal text as a model for this section, they were also
personally targets of federal polygamy prosecutions.40
Consequently, the drafters of the various attempts at a state
constitution very likely personally experienced searches of their
homes and effects in conjunction with Morrill and Edmunds
investigations and prosecutions.41 The totality of this societal

40

Firmage, at 771-778.

A1

See Bradley, Hide and Seek: Children of the Underground, 51 Utah
Historical Quarterly 133 (1983) (recounting how a polygamist's home was searched
100 times in a four year period; See also "How They Do It," Deseret News Weekly,
January 20, 1886 at 1 (explaining how federal marshals entered a polygamist's
home without a warrant and by breaking the door with an axe; Ivans, A
Constitution for Utah, 25 Utah Historical Quarterly 95, 100 (1957); White, The
Making of the Convention President: The Political Education of John Henry Smith,
39 Utah Historical Quarterly 351,357 (1971) (detailing how John H. Smith, a
Mormon apostle and President of the constitutional convention of 1895 practiced
polygamy and had been the target of federal marshals' searches); Paneck, A
peculiar People and Their Constitution: The Culture and Times of 19th Century
Utah, 6, unpublished manuscript in the possession of Mr. Kenneth R. Wallentine
(recording how several members of the
subcommittee selected to draft the declaration of rights for the 1895
constitution had publicly protested the search and seizure practices of the
federal marshals).
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and constitutional history of Utah, therefore, strongly suggests a
heightened appreciation and valuation of the privacy rights in
personal effects - particularly one's home. Accordingly, Defendants
argue that Article I, Section 14 should be interpreted to reflect
that Utah society would recognize as reasonable, an expectation of
privacy in one's residential garbage.
b) The "primacy" model
"Primacy" means "the state of being first (as in rank)." 42 The
term "primacy model," in the context of state constitutional
analysis has two branches. "State bills of rights are first in two
senses: first in time and first in logic."43
The first branch of the primacy model recognizes that
principals of state constitutions predate the federal constitution
which was itself patterned after the state documents:
By 1783, thirteen states, all but Rhode Island, had
adopted written constitutions. The majority of them
contained most of the catalogue of civil liberties
included in Virginia's Declaration of Rights and
Maryland's and Delaware's and Pennsylvania's. But they
were by no means identical. That was no accident. During
the months preceding independence, political leaders
debated the case for having the Constitutional Congress
prepare uniform constitutions for the states. They
finally rejected this idea in favor of calling upon each
state to write a constitution satisfactory to itself.44

^The Merriam-Webster Dictionary, G. & C. Merriam Co. (1974).
43

Justice Hans A. L m d e , First Things First: Rediscovering the States1
Bills of Rights, 9 University of Baltimore Law Review 379 (1980).
44

L m d e , at 381; F. Green, Constitutional Development in the South
Atlantic States, 1776-1860, at 52-56 (1930) .
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Far from being the model for the state, the Federal Bill
of Rights was added to the Constitution to meet demands
for the same guarantees against the new central
government that people had secured against their own
local officials. Moreover, the states that adopted the
new constitutions during the following decades took their
bill of rights from the preexisting state constitutions
rather from the federal amendments.
The Federal Bill of Rights did not supersede those of the
states. It was not interposed between the citizen and his
state. ... Only the Civil War made it clear that it might
sometimes be necessary to use federal law as a mode of
doing that which a state could but did not do for itself
- the protection of some of its citizens against those in
control of its government.
It is the fourteenth amendment that has bound the states
to observe the guarantees of the Federal Bill of Rights.
We tend to forget how recently the application of the
Federal Bill of Rights to the states developed.
Throughout the nineteenth century and the first quarter
of the twentieth, state courts decided questions of
constitutional rights under their own state
constitutions. ... Of course, the states had all these
guarantees in their own laws long before the Federal Bill
of Rights was applied to the states. State courts had
been administering these laws, sometime generously, more
often not, for a century or more without awaiting an
interpretation from the United States Supreme Court.45
The second branch of the primacy model posits that "[j]ust as
rights under the state constitutions were first in time, they are
first also in the logic of constitutional law."46 "The primacy
model treats the state constitution as the fundamental wellspring
of individual rights. Federal decisions and their underlying

Linde, at 380-382; see, also generally Note, The Utah Supreme Court and
the Utah Constitution, 1986 Utah Law Review 319.
46

Linde, at 383.
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analysis are regarded as persuasive, although not controlling,
authority."47 As the Connecticut Supreme Court stated:
In [civil liberty] adjudication, our first referent is
Connecticut law and the full panoply of rights
Connecticut residents have come to expect as their due.
Accordingly, decisions of the United States Supreme Court
defining fundamental rights are persuasive authority to
be afforded respectful consideration, but they are to be
followed by Connecticut courts only when they provide no
less individual protection than is guaranteed by
Connecticut law.48
Dicta in several Utah appellate court decisions hints that the
primacy model may be appropriate for Utah jurisprudence. Justice
Zimmerman has noted "[t]he federal law as it currently exists is
certainly not the only permissible interpretation of the search and
seizure protections contained in the Utah Constitution....[s]ound
argument may be made in favor of position at variance with the
current federal law respecting both the scope of the individual's
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures and the
remedy for any violation of that right."49 Defendants argue that
the primacy model is an appropriate methodology for interpretation
of the breadth and depth of the rights guaranteed by the Utah
Constitution generally and by Article I, Section 14 specifically.
Under this theory this Court is free to conclude that the Utah

Wallentine, at 9.
48

State v Marsala, 579 A.2d 58 (Conn., 1990).

49

State v. Hvah, 711 P.2d 264, 272-273 (Utah 1985); see also Malan v.
Lewis, 693 P.2d 661 (Utah 1984); State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219, 1221 n.8 (Utah
1988); State v Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 108 (Ut. App., 1987) (Billings, J.,
dissenting).
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Constitution accepts as reasonable an expectation of privacy in
one's residential garbage, irrespective of the United States
Supreme Court's contrary position on the issue. This Court should
so rule.
c) Analogous holdings and reasoning
As the United States Supreme Court held in Katz, "[wjhat a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or
office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection. [Citation]
But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area
accessible to the public, may be constitutionally
protected.[Citations.]"50

Five states have determined that their

state constitutions recognize an expectation of privacy in
residential garbage: People v. Krivda,51 486 P.2d 1262 (Cal.,
1971), State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274 (Hawaii 1985), State v.
Hempele, 576 A.2d 793 (N.J. 1990), State v. Boland, 800 P.2d 1112
(Wash. 1990), and Moran v. Indiana, 625 N.E.2d 1231 (Ind. 1993).
Seemingly, implementing the reasoning of Katz, and
notwithstanding the existence of federal court holdings to the
contrary, the Supreme Court of Hawaii, in Tanaka, reviewed three

Katz, above, at 351-352.
In this case the California Supreme Court held that society is prepared
to accept one's expectation of privacy in residential garbage set at the curb
for collection by a municipal authority. While the Krivda decision does not
clearly explain whether such holding is based on an interpretation of the United
States Constitution or the California Constitution, the United States Supreme
Court in Greenwood, above, determined that the Krivda holding was based on both
constitutions. See Greenwood at 39.
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warrantless residential garbage search challenges (one of which
presented a factual setting substantially similar to the case
before this Court) and concluded:
The main issue is whether society is prepared to
recognize defendants' expectation of privacy as
reasonable.... In our view, [the Hawaii Constitution's
search and seizure provision] recognizes an expectation
of privacy beyond the parallel provisions in the Federal
Bill of Rights.
[W]e believe defendants1 expectations of privacy are ones
society is prepared to recognize. People reasonably
believe that police will not indiscriminately rummage
through their trash bags to discover their personal
effects. Business records, bills, correspondence,
magazines, tax records, and other telltale refuse can
reveal much about a person's activities, associations,
and beliefs. If we were to hold otherwise, police could
search everyone's trash bags on their property without
any reason and thereby learn of their activities,
associations, and beliefs. It is exactly the type of
overbroad governmental intrusion that [the Hawaii
Constitution's search and seizure provision] was intended
to prevent.
Similarly, the Hempele court, noting that "[c]lues to people's
most private affairs can be found in their garbage...." and

"[a]

plethora of personal information can be culled from garbage: a
single bag of trash testifies eloquently to the eating, reading,
and recreational habits of the person who produced it[,]" 52 found
it reasonable to expect privacy in one's residential garbage.
In Boland, the Washington Supreme Court held that "[w]hile a
person must reasonably expect a licensed trash collector will

Hempele. above, at 8 02-803.
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remove the contents of his trash can, this expectation does not
also infer an expectation of governmental intrusion."5~
In Moran, the Indiana Supreme Court held that [w]arrantless
searches are presumptively unreasonable, and the burden is placed
on the state to show that the search falls within one of the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. The common thread
underlying the recognized exceptions is the concept of ^exigent
circumstances' which render the procurement of a warrant
impractical or inadvisable because of a danger of harm to
individuals or the potential destruction of evidence."54
This Court is urged to pay particular attention to the
reasoning of Justice Brennan's dissent in the United States Supreme
Court garbage search case (Greenwood), with whom Justice Marshall
joined:
Scrutiny of another's trash is contrary to commonly
accepted notions of civilized behavior.
1

[A]lmost every human activity ultimately manifests
itself in waste products....f [Citations]
T

If you want to know what is really going on in a
community, look at its garbage1 (quoting renowned
archeologist, Emil Haury)
It cannot be doubted that a sealed trash bag harbors
telling evidence of the "intimate activity associated
with the 'sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of
life.f "

Boland, above, at 1117.
'Mor&n, above, at 123 9.
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Most of us, I believe, would be incensed to discover a
meddler - whether a neighbor, a reporter, or a detective
- scrutinizing our sealed trash containers to discover
some detail of our personal lives.
The mere possibility that unwelcome meddlers might open
and rummage through the containers does not negate the
expectation of privacy in their contents any more than
the possibility of a burglary negates an expectation of
privacy in the home;...'What a person ... seeks to
preserve as private, even in an area accessible to the
public, may be constitutionally protected."[Citing to
Katzl. (emphasis in the original).
[T]he voluntary relinquishment of possession or control
over an effect does not necessarily amount to a
relinquishment of privacy expectation in it. Were it
otherwise, a letter or package would lose all Fourth
Amendment protection when placed in a mailbox or other
depository. . .55
Of additional significance to the Greenwood dissent was the
fact that Greenwood was compelled by county ordinance to set his
trash curbside for weekly pick-up by the municipal authority and
prohibited from accumulating it on his property or disposing of it
in any other fashion.56 Similarly, in Defendants1 situation, Provo
City Revised Ordinances 7.03.080(4) (c) prohibits accumulation of
garbage by any owner or occupier of real property "which is not
securely protected from flies." Other provisions of the Provo City
Revised Ordinances provide as follows:
PCRO 11.02.010. Mandatory Residential Service by Provo City

Greenwood, above, (Brennan and Marshall J.J., dissenting), at 1632-1637.

Greenwood, above, (Brennan and Marshall, J.J. dissenting), at 1635-1637.
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Provo City shall provide mandatory residential collection
service to all structures used for human habitation, which do
not contain more than two dwelling units.57
PCRO 11.02.030. Regulations Applicable to Provo City
Residential Collection.
(1) Residential solid waste shall be collected only from
containers obtained from Provo City. (Containers
obtained from Provo City are specially designed for
use in an automated collection system.)
(3)

Except where the director shall otherwise agree,
collections shall be made from the street.
Containers shall be placed at the edge of the street
in a manner that will allow a collection truck to be
driven to the side of the container.

As in Greenwood, Defendants here were compelled to place their
refuse at the curbside, outside of their curtilage, each week, for
pick-up by Provo City garbage trucks. They were prohibited from
accumulating trash on the premises. They were further prohibited
from disposing of their trash other than by way of Provo City's
"mandatory" residential trash collection service. Defendants did
not abandon their trash in the sense that they placed it at the
street for any and all passers-by to rummage through. Rather, the
trash was placed on the street in reasonable reliance that it would
be handled only by Provo City trash collectors, consistent with the
above-noted ordinances. Defendants had no choice but to place the
garbage on the street. It is contrary to constitutional concepts of
citizens' security in their property to mandate them by ordinance
to place it in an area where it will be subject to search by the

The residence in the case before this Court does not contain more than
two dwelling units.
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very government which compelled them to place it there in the first
place.
The Utah Supreme Court has already decided a case which is
substantially analogous to the case before this Court. In State v.
Thompson, 810 P.2d 415, Defendants sought protection under Article
I, Section 14 from the government's search of their bank records
held by their banks. The banks and not the Defendants had been the
subject of the searches. Defendants asserted a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the bank records held by their banks,
notwithstanding that the United States Supreme Court had previously
held that no such expectation of privacy was recognized under the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.56 Noting
that other state courts had rejected the Miller holding under their
state constitutions, and further noting that such other state
courts "found the rationale in Katz v United States, that ! the
Fourth Amendment protects people, not places,f to be more
persuasive than that of Miller f,1" the Court agreed with Defendants
that Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution recognized a
right of privacy in Defendants to the bank records held by their
banks.
Justice Zimmerman, concurring in the holding of Thompson,
stated:
[w]e are rejecting the argument advanced by the State
that we should follow federal standing law and deny those
CO

United States v

Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
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not directly subjected to the search any right to
challenge its legality. [Citations.]
I find this entirely appropriate. Even where federal
rights are at stake, standing law is state law, and we
are not bound to follow federal precedent.[Citation.] In
the area of search and seizure, the federal courts have
developed extraordinarily restrictive doctrines that have
the effect, if not the purpose, of placing a large
percentage of illegal activities beyond the scrutiny of
the courts. [Citations.] I see no reason for us to follow
suit, especially when state constitutional rights, which
we have a peculiar obligation to protect are at stake.
Because the court m

Thompson found defendants had standing to

challenge the search, it also necessarily found Defendants had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in the records left with their
banks.59 Justice Zimmerman emphasized two important points in his
concurring opinion: a) standing (and therefore a determination of a
claim of a reasonable expectation of privacy) is a state law
question, and b) restrictive federal doctrines that serve to
insulate illegal searches from judicial scrutiny should not be
adhered to by this State. Thompson therefore stands for the
principal that determining the reasonableness of one's expectation
of privacy (the issue raised in this case by these Defendants) is a
state law issue and that the guidelines developed by federal
decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment should not necessarily
be followed (primacy model).
Defendants argue that Thompson allows, if not directs, this
Court to make an independent determination under Article I, Section
14 of the Utah Constitution, of whether Defendants have a

See Rakas v Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
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reasonable expectation of privacy in their residential garbage left
at curbside. Defendant's argue that Thompson further suggests that
Fourth Amendment principals and holdings in this regard are not
controlling in such determination. Defendants lastly argue that the
reasoning of the dissent in Greenwood as well as the holdings of
Krivda, Tanaka, Hempele, Boland, and Moran should serve as guidance
in the determination.
C.

Good Faith exception viz a viz Article I, Section 14,
Constitution of Utah
The Utah Supreme Court has held that an exclusionary rule does

apply to violations of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah
Constitution,60 however, it does not appear that Utah Appellate
courts have decided whether a good faith exception similar to the
one set forth in United State v Leon is applicable to violations of
Article I, Section 14. Defendants argue that no good faith
exception should save improperly issued search warrants from the
effect of the Utah Constitutional exclusionary rule. At least one
Utah appellate Justice has opined that "a healthy skepticism should
permeate the court's consideration [of a good faith exception to
Article I, Section 14] in view of the troublesome analysis in
Leon,bl and the Supreme Court noted, without comment, that

Larocco, above; Thompson, above.
61

State v Rowe. 806 P.2d 730, 743 (Ut. App. 1991).
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Connecticut has found a good faith exception incompatible with its
constitution.62
States that have rejected a good faith exception to their
state constitutions are as follows. New York, People v. Biaelow,
488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y., 1985) (exclusionary rule's purpose would be
frustrated, a premium would be placed on illegal police action,
would create incentive to others to act illegally); Michigan,
People v Sundlinq, 395 N.W.2nd 308 (Mich. App. 1986)

(exclusionary

rule in its present form is necessary to preservation of right to
be free from unreasonable government intrusion); New Jersey, State
v Novembrino, 519 A.2d 820 (N.J., 1987) (would undermine police
motivation to comply with constitutional requirement of probable
cause, would diminish quality of evidence presented in search
warrant applications); North Carolina, State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d
553 (N.C., 1988) (judicial integrity demands suppression of
illegally obtained evidence); Connecticut, State v Marsala, 579
A.2d 58 (Conn., 1990) (would discourage thorough police work, would
discourage proper care taken by magistrates, would encourage
reviewing courts to simply look for good faith instead of reviewing
the probable cause requirement); Pennsylvania, Commonwealth v.
Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887 (Penn., 1991) (would clash with strong right
of privacy guaranteed in the Pennsylvania Constitution); Vermont,
State v Oakes, 598 A.2d 119 (Vt., 1991) (Vermont is not persuaded

Thompson, above, n.4.
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that the cost/benefit analysis of Leon is accurate); Idaho, State
v. Guzman, 842 P.2d 660 (Id., 1992) ("we finally and unequivocally
no longer adhere to a policy of sheepishly following in the
footsteps of the U.S. Supreme Court in the area of state
constitutional analysis." the good faith exception is ill
conceived); New Mexico, State v, Gutierrez, 863 P.2d 1052 (N.M.,
1993) (incompatible with the New Mexico Constitution).
Defendants argue that the reasoning of the states that have
rejected the good faith exception for their own constitutions is
compelling. Utah should not undermine the integrity of the
judiciary, emasculate Article I, Section 14, encourage sloppy
police work, or encourage lazy magisterial, trial, and appellate
court review by adopting a good faith exception to the State's
constitution.
POINT III
The evidence obtained must be suppressed because
the Defendants' fundamental rights were violated
In State v. Rowe, 850 P.2d 427,429 (Utah 1993) (Rowe II) the
Utah Supreme Court held that "suppression of evidence is an
appropriate remedy for illegal police conduct only when that
conduct implicates a fundamental violation of a Defendant's
rights."

In State v. Simmons, 866 P.2d 614 (Ut. App., 1993) the

Utah Court of Appeals, citing to Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978) held "[t]he proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden
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of establishing that his [or her] own Fourth Amendment rights were
violated by the challenged search."63
In this matter, if the evidence found in the garbage
containers did not provide the issuing magistrate with a fair
probability to conclude contraband was probably in Defendants1
residence, or if this Court finds the warrantless search of the
Defendants' garbage containers was unconstitutional under Article
I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, the warrant was improperly
issued.

Because, as argued above, the warrant cannot be saved by

the Leon "good faith" exception, or, alternatively, if this Court
concludes that a Leon type "good faith// exception is not
appropriate in an interpretation of the Utah Constitution, the
search was illegal. Because the police did not have an alternative
authority to enter the residence (as in Rowe II 64 ), the search
necessarily violated each Defendant's fundamental rights.

63

See a l s o S t a t e v R i b e ,

876 P . 2 d 403 ( U t . A p p . ,

64

Rowe I I .

at

429-430.
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1994).

CONCLUSIONS
The warrant in this case was improperly issued under both the
Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution because the
supporting affidavit did not provide the magistrate with a fair
probability to conclude contraband was probably in the house where
the officers were directed by the warrant- A good faith exception
does not apply in these circumstances, either because the officer's
actions fell under one of the four recognized exceptions to the
exception of United States v. Leon or because there is no good
faith exception to the Utah Constitution. Consequently all evidence
derived as a direct or indirect65 result of service of the warrant
should be suppressed.^
Dated this sp(\

day of August, 1996.

Thomas H. Means
Attorney for Defendants/
Appellants

65

Wona Sun v United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
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Ruling on Defendants' Motion to Suppress
Affidavit in Support of and Request for Search Warrant

42

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T ^ < S 2 l Q
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
QlX~'
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RULING ON DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO SUPPRESS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 941400506
vs.

CASE NO. 941400507

PATRICIA E. SMITH,
RAQUEL NIELSEN,
BRENT JACKSON,

CASE NO. 941400508

DATE: March 23, 1995
Defendants.

JUDGE: LYNN W. DAVIS

This matter came before the Court on Defendants' Motion to suppress. Oral arguments
were heard on February 7, 1995. Defendants appeared and were represented by Thomas H.
Means, with the State being represented by James R. Taylor, Deputy Utah County Attorney.
The Court, after carefully considering the memoranda and oral arguments, now enters the
following:
RULING
L
FACTS AND PROCEDURE
On the eighth of June 1994, Sergeant Jerry Harper, of the Provo Police Department
searched the trash receptacles, (two), of the Defendants' home after they had been placed in
the street for collection. According to the information in the affidavit in support of the
requested warrant, the officer identified no reason for the search of the trash cans. He did,
however, mention two previous incidents which implicated the residents in drug involvement:

1

1) approximately 36 days prior to the search of the trash receptacles, one of the residents pled
guilty to possession of marijuana and paraphernalia; 2) approximately 56 days prior to the
search of the receptacles, two of the residents were involved in an incident where several men
entered their home and held them captive while demanding money and drugs.
Sergeant Harper found within the receptacles some marijuana stems, seeds, Zig-Zag
papers, and a small "piece" of marijuana. Also found was some personal correspondence with
the names of two of the residents of the home in question. Based on the results of the search
an affidavit was prepared and submitted to a magistrate. The Affidavit also mentioned the
prior drug-related incidents. A warrant was issued for the home, and further evidence was
found during the search of the home. Defendants were arrested and charged with possession
of drugs and paraphernalia.
IL
ISSUES PRESENTED
(1) Is the affidavit submitted in support of the search warrant fatally flawed, and
therefore, lacking a substantial basis for issuance of a warrant?
(2) Do Utah citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy in trash placed in a city
provided container and left at the edge of the city street for pickup?
IIL
DISCUSSION
A. Sufficiency of the Affidavit
Defendants argue that some of the information contained in the Affidavit in support of
the warrant is irrelevant. This Court agrees. Several of the paragraphs in the Affidavit
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include information which is spurious to the magistrate's determination of probable cause.
However, such information does not invalidate the warrant. The burden placed upon the State
in placing an affidavit before a magistrate is "a reasonable belief that the evidence sought is
located at the place indicated by the policeman's affidavit."

State v. Brooks. 849 P.2d 640,

643 (Utah App. 1993). Assuming, arguendo, that all the paragraphs mentioned by Defendants
in their memorandum were determined to be irrelevant, and therefore, removed from
consideration, State v. Potter. 860 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1993), there is still sufficient
information in the affidavit to establish probable cause. Under Illinois v. Gates. 462 U.S. 213
(1983), a "totality of the circumstances" analysis is proper and, even with the limited
information left after removing the alleged irrelevant information, a magistrate could have a
reasonable belief that the "evidence sought," (drugs), would be found "at the place indicated."
Brooks. 849 P.2d at 643.
Defendants' argument that the evidence in the trash receptacles was 'stale' is
unpersuasive. While it is conceivable that the trash could have been there for longer than a
week, it is reasonable for the magistrate to conclude that the trash had been in the containers
for a week or less.

Thus a "common-sense reading of the affidavit" would suggest that drugs

would probably be in the home. State v. Hansen. 732 P.2d 127, 131 (Utah 1987).
Defendants' argument that the prior bad acts were stale or improper may have some
validity. Sergeant Harper does appear to justify his search of the trash receptacles by
including references to prior involvement and alleged involvement with drugs. (See Affidavit
paragraphs 2 & 3). While Defendants do not support their position with any case law or
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firm

statutory claim, it does strike the Court as improper to justify a search on the prior history of
the individuals to be searched.
Other arguments made by the Defendants are neither persuasive nor supported by
substantive law.

The Court finds that the Affidavit is not fatally flawed and that a

substantial basis existed in the Affidavit, under current law, for the magistrate to issue the
warrant.

B. The Right of Piivacy in Garbage under the Federal Constitution and the Utah
Constitution.
The next issue to be resolved is whether Utah citizens have a protectable expectation
of privacy in garbage placed in a city provided container and left at the edge of the street for
pickup? This issue has two parts: 1) The protection of an expectation of privacy in garbage
allowed by the provisions of the U.S. Constitution and federal case law; and 2) The
protection of an expectation of privacy in garbage under the provisions of the Utah
Constitution.
1. Protection under the Fourth Amendment of the Federal Constitution.
The controlling federal case is California v. Greenwood. 486 U.S. 35 (1988), which
establishes the principle that a person has no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash placed
outside the curtilage of the home. Id. at 37. The Supreme Court did not address whether
searches of garbage left within the curtilage of the home were prohibited under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. While the present case is similar to Greenwood, it can, contrary to the
assertions of the State, be distinguished from Greenwood. In Greenwood, the police officer
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had received information from an informant that illicit drugs had been shipped to the address
in question, and acting on that information began a surveillance of the home. Based on
suspicious activity at the address in the course of the surveillance, the officer searched the
trash and found sufficient evidence to establish the probable cause necessary for issuance of a
warrant. IdL at 37-38. In the instant case, much of what supported the actions of the police in
the Greenwood case is lacking. However, in spite of these distinguishing facts the warrantless
search of the garbage in the instant case did not violate the two prong test of Greenwood. Id.
at 39.
In applying the first part of the Greenwood test the United States Supreme Court held
that such warrantless searches "would violate the Fourth Amendment only if [defendants had]
manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage . . ." Id. While no affidavits
or other evidence were submitted with memoranda to show that defendants had such an
expectation of privacy in their garbage, counsel at oral argument offered to have defendants
testify to that fact. The Court declined such testimony as being unnecessary to reach a
determination on the expectations of the defendants. For the purposes of this opinion, it will
be accepted that the defendants had such an expectation of privacy; this, however, is not the
end of the federal protection examination.
The second part of the Greenwood test must also be met before protection is warranted
under the Fourth Amendment — the expectation of privacy must be one that "society accepts
as objectively reasonable.'1 Id. The U.S. Supreme Court in Greenwood determined that such
an expectation of privacy in garbage is not reasonable when the garbage is placed on the curb
or alongside the street because it then becomes vulnerable to an unscrupulous person or
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scavenging animal. Because a reasonable person would know that such garbage is available
to curious members of the public, any expectation of privacy is unreasonable. A reasonable
person cannot expect "police . . .to avert their eyes from evidence of criminal activity that
could have been observed by any member of the public." Id. at 41.
In the instant case, the Defendants left their garbage at the edge of the city street,
outside of the curtilage of the home, for collection where it was available for the possible
perusal of anyone who wished to take the time to do so. Therefore, there is no question that
the second test under Greenwood has not been met. However, the U.S. Supreme Court also
suggested that "States may surely construe their own constitutions as imposing more stringent
constraints on police conduct than does the Federal Constitution." I d at 43. The Court
recognizes that while a state may not construe its own state constitution to infringe upon the
rights set forth in the Federal Constitution, a state may provide for greater protection of its
citizens' rights than that provided by the Federal Constitution. Therefore, this Court must yet
consider whether the subject search was a violation of state guarantees embodied in the Utah
State Constitution.
2. Protection under the Utah Constitution.
There are some additional facts, established from the presentation of evidence through
proffer and by the Court taking judicial notice, which are pertinent to the state constitutional
analysis. These facts are: 1) garbage containers in the city of Provo are owned and supplied
by the city; 2) garbage collection occurs weekly and on a day certain; 3) collection is made
by city employees in city owned trucks; 4) the garbage containers in question were owned by
the city of Provo; 5) the garbage container in question was placed on city property,
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ostensibly for collection purposes, and was outside the curtilage of the residence; 6) no local
ordinance exists which prohibits any person from disturbing garbage placed on a public street
for collection or in anyway restricting access to such garbage.
The final issue is whether there is a greater protection of one's expectation of privacy
in garbage under the Utah Constitution. Specifically, does Utah society, under the state
constitution, accept as objectively reasonable, an expectation of privacy in garbage?
Defendants argue that the history of Utah is unique and supports a societal expectation
that individuals have a reasonable belief that their garbage would be free from governmental
intrusion. The original pioneer settlers of the region suffered much at the hands of various
state governments because of their religious beliefs and communal, ecclesiastically directed
society. In three different states the government either ignored or condoned the persecution
which was suffered by those who would eventually flee to, and settle the Utah basin. Even
after this region was settled, the people, especially the society leaders, continued to suffer
persecution at the hands of federal officials who often conducted searches and seizures of
homes and effects without warrants in an attempt to enforce the anti-polygamy laws. (See
Defendants' Memorandum pp. 24 - 25). Defendants, therefore, argue that such actions created
distrust and suspicion of government on the part of the drafters of the Utah Constitution.
This mistrust and suspicion would have motivated them to expect greater protection against
such invasions of privacy from the provisions of the state constitution. Ironically, the
wording of the appropriate provision, Article I, Section 14, of the Utah Constitution is nearly
identical to the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, and therefore, at first glance
would appear to hold the same level of protection as does the Federal Constitution.
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Whether the Utah constitution supports an expectation of privacy in trash is unresolved
in Utah. Other states have found that an expectation of privacy is reasonable under their state
constitutions. While the determination of other sovereign states is not determinative of the
question, the rationale and reasoning used by them may be helpful in considering the issue.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey found in State v. Hempele. 576 A.2d 793, (N.J.
1990), that under the relevant provision of that state Constitution, Article I, Section 7, an
expectation of privacy need only be reasonable.1 Icl at 802. The facts in Hempele, (which
was a consolation of two cases), are similar to the facts in the instant case; the garbage was
placed for collection near the street and then removed by police and searched. The New
Jersey court appears to reach its conclusion based on concerns that "[cjlues to people's most
private affairs can be found in their garbage. . . . A plethora of personal information can be
culled from garbage: a single bag of trash testifies eloquently to the eating, reading, and
recreational habits of the person who produced it." Hempele 576 A.2d at 802-803. Further,
local ordinances prohibited "any person to * * * disturb * * * garbage * * * placed on any
curb, street or public place." I d at 805, (citation omitted).
The Supreme Court of Indiana also found that an expectation of privacy in garbage is
reasonable. Moran v. Indiana. 625 N.E. 1231 (Ind. 1993). The facts of the Indiana case are
again similar to the instant case: garbage had been placed in plastic containers and set out for

1

The New Jersey Constitution reads lfThe right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the papers and things to be seized."
N.J. Const, of 1947 art.I, para 7.
8

collection at the end of the residential driveway approximately a foot from the street. The
containers held several opaque plastic bags which the police removed and searched. In
Mo ran the court stated that "[ujnder Indiana law, warrantless searches are presumptively
unreasonable, and the burden is placed on the state to show that the search falls within one of
the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement. The common thread underlying the
recognized exceptions is the concept of Exigent circumstances 1 which render the procurement
of a warrant impractical or inadvisable because of a danger of harm to individuals or the
potential destruction of evidence." Id. at 1239. The court went on to find that no exigent
circumstances existed, and therefore, the search of the garbage violated the protection against
unreasonable search and seizure found in Art. I, § 11 of the Indiana Constitution. 2
In State v. Tanaka, 701 P.2d 1274 (Hawaii 1985), the Supreme Court of Hawaii found
that an expectation of privacy existed in garbage. The facts of the Tanaka case, which entail
three consolidated cases, are similar to the instant case but there is one important
distinguishing characteristic—the garbage searched was located within the private property of
the individual being charged. Thus, the police had to trespass onto the private property to
gain access to the garbage searched. However, in at least one of the three consolidated cases
the garbage was at the curbside of the defendants property. In the view of the Hawaii court,
the Hawaii Constitution, article I, § 7 "recognizes an expectation of privacy beyond the

2

The Indiana Constitution reads: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable search or seizure, shall not be violated;
and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the person or thing to be seized." Article I, § 11,
Indiana Constitution.
9

parallel provisions in the Federal Bill of Rights." IcL at 1276. The Hawaii court went on to
say:
[p]eople reasonably believe that police will not indiscriminately rummage through their
trash bags to discover their personal effects. Business records, bills, correspondence,
magazines, tax records, and other telltale refuse can reveal much about a person's
activities, associations, and beliefs. If we were to hold otherwise, police could search
everyone's trash bags on their property without any reason and thereby learn of their
activities, associations, and beliefs. It is exactly this type of overbroad governmental
intrusion that article I, § 7 of the Hawaii Constitution was intended to prevent.3
Tanaka 701 P.2d at 1276, 1277.
The Hawaii court explained that an expectation of privacy did not preclude any
searches by police of garbage but required that a warrant be obtained or that exigent
circumstances be shown which would reasonably justify a warrantless search. I<I
The state of Washington also has found an expectation of privacy in garbage under the
Washington State Constitution. In State v. Boland. 800 P.2d 1112 (Wash. 1990),
Washington's highest court utilized criteria previously set down in State v. GunwalL 720 P.2d

3

The text of article I, § 7 of the Hawaii Constitution

reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches,
seizures and invasions of privacy shall not be violated; and
no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported
by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized
or the communications sought to be intercepted.
Interestingly enough the Hawaii Constitution has an
additional provision regarding the right of privacy. This is
article I, § 6, which reads:
The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state
interest. The legislature shall take affirmative steps to
implement this right.
10

808 (Wash 1986)

1) textual differences can provide a basis for a conclusion which would

differ from that reached under the Federal Constitution, 2) differences in parallel provisions
of the state and federal constitutions could dictate varying conclusions, 3) State common law
history may reflect an intention to confer greater protection than the federal provisions; 4)
Previously established state law may provide the basis to define the scope of a state
constitutional right; 5) Differences in structure of the constitutions may require disparate
results, (e.g the state may guarantee rights which are not protected on a federal level), 6)
The matter may be of particular state or local interest Gunwall. 720 P 2d at 812, 813
The Washington Supreme Court rejected the federal analysis stating that

M

[w]hile a

person must reasonably expect a licensed trash collector will remove the contents of his trash
can, this expectation does not also infer an expectation of governmental intrusion " Boland.
800 P.2d at 1117. Further, the Washington court using the criteria set forth in Gunwall found
that a search of garbage was an intrusion into the private affairs and therefore a violation of
the Washington Constitution, Art I, § 7 / Id. at 1114-1116
Of the states which have found a greater protection of an expectation of privacy than
the federal scheme allows, two have significant constitutional textual differences from the
Fourth Amendment, both Hawaii and Washington have unique and explicit wording which
lends itself to a broader reading of protection than found in the Fourth Amendment
Indiana and New Jersey, on the other hand, have state constitutional provisions which
are nearly identical to the Fourth Amendment and the Utah provision

4

In both the Indiana

The Washington Constitution provides at Art. I, § 7 that:
"No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home
invaded, without authority of law.11
11

and New Jersey cases, the facts were essentially the same as in the instant case, and the
highest state court still found a heightened level of protection of an expectation of privacy in
garbage.
However, while recognizing that some states have found a greater level of privacy
protection in their state constitutions, this Court must also recognize that the majority of states
have followed the federal analysis, and have not found independent grounds to provide for
greater protection than that provided by the Fourth Amendment in this area.5

5

Hillman v. State, 834 P.2d 1271 (Colo. 1992) (defendant
had no reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage bags left at
curb for collection); Walls v. State, 536 So.2d 137, 138-39 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1988), cert, denied, 490 U.S. 1020 (1989) (search of
defendant's garbage located in front of his residence did not
violate a proprietary interest in it, citing Greenwood); State
v. Mooney, 588 A.2d 145, 157 n. 14, cert, denied, 502 U.S. 919,
112 S.Ct. 330 (Conn. 1991) (observed that trash bags, while
closed containers, may not carry a reasonable expectation of
privacy when placed beyond the curtilage of a home for
collection); State v. Fisher, 591 So.2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1991) (concluded that defendants sufficiently exposed
their garbage to the public to defeat Fourth Amendment protection
when placing it in plastic cans located in front of the house on
the road right-of-way); Perkins v. State, 398 S.E.2d 702, 704
(Ga. App. 1990) (followed Greenwood); People v. Collins, 478
N.E.2d 267, 278-79, cert, denied, 474 U.S. 935 (111. 1985) (found
no reasonable expectation of privacy in a garbage bag left on a
second floor landing of an outside stairway because such area was
an openly accessible common area of the apartment building);
State v. Henderson, 435 N.W.2d 394 (Iowa Ct. App. 1988) (found no
violation of the Iowa Constitution where evidence was seized from
trash bags that were tied shut and placed in metal garbage cans) ;
In re Forfeiture of U.S. Currency, 450 N.W.2d 93, 94 (Mich. App.
1989) (followed Greenwood); State v. Krech, 403 N.W.2d 634,
637-38 (Minn. 1987) (concluded that defendants did not have a
reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage wrapped in plastic
bags and placed in cans in back of a duplex a few feet away from
an alley where defendant's customers typically walked near the
garbage in route to the back entrance); State v. Texel, 4 33
N.W.2d 541, 543 (Neb. 1989) (held that no reasonable expectation
of privacy exists in garbage which has been made accessible to
the public); Commonwealth v. Perdue, 564 A.2d 489, 493 (Pa.
Super. 1989), appeal denied, 574 A.2d 68 (1990) (found no
12

In the states which found a level of privacy protection greater than the federal scheme,
the reasoning appears to center on a philosophical argument—that unless restraints are placed
on the police powers of government, those who exercise those powers will abuse it. There is
no question that the general public would be incensed if the police began to randomly pick up
garbage placed in front of residences1 looking for evidence of wrongdoing. Even those
citizens who are model citizens would likely become paranoid about their lives and examine
each item discarded, looking for anything which could or might lead to possible arrest or even
public embarrassment. Such arguments have a certain attractiveness in that they are easily
reconciled with the underlying rationale of the protection inherent in the Bill of Rights.
However, philosophical arguments are often stretched too far. The mere parading of a list of
horribles does not make them a reality. The reality of budgetary and personnel constraints
placed upon police make such actions unlikely. In the various cases examined by this Court
the police have not randomly selected an individual's garbage, but have had a reasonable
suspicion that illegal activity was taking place within the house from which the garbage came.
Reaching a balance between the two conflicting ideas of personal liberty and
communal safety requires a constant shifting of resources and authority because societal
values change. Not long ago, each home would burn its own garbage and spread the ashes to
the wind—today society does not accept such practices as beneficial to the community.
Society has developed different technology to handle the garbage produced in day-to-day

reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage left for collection
subject to public inspection); State v. Stevens, 367 N.W.2d 788,
797, cert, denied, 474 U.S. 852 (Wis. 1985) (found that, as trash
moves farther from the home, any expectation of privacy in it is
diminished).
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living. These technology changes have influenced the way we, as a society, view persona!
liberty. Any determination of the expectations of society must be weighed against the norms
of today, as influenced by the past, but not by the values and standards of the past.
In our highly mobile society it would be difficult for someone to remember which
states accept an expectation of privacy in garbage and which do not. A uniform standard has
great appeal because of the certainty and stability which it engenders. However, uniformity
benefits Jtf are not, standing alone, sufficient to determine whether Utah society accepts the
federal scheme of privacy protection in garbage.
The Utah Supreme Court has not addressed expectation of privacy in garbage directly.
The Utah Supreme Court has, however, on at least one occasion interpreted the provisions of
the Utah Constitution in a manner which may be read to expand the civil liberties of the
citizens of Utah beyond the federal threshold. See State v. Thompson. 810 P.2d 415 (Utah
1991), (recognized an expectation of privacy in bank records under state constitution where
the federal constitution does not). The facts of Thompson are sufficiently different from the
instant case to distinguish it from the instant case and for Thompson to be insufficient to
support a greater expectation of privacy in garbage under the Utah Constitution than the
Federal Constitution.
It seems to this Court that any decision which announces a heightened expectation of
privacy in garbage, under a state constitutional analysis, must fairly, reasonably, and clearly
articulate the reasons. Any such decision should not simply be an attempt to viscerally
sidestep Greenwood. The minority arguments in Greenwood are compelling and persuasive,
in the estimation of this Court, but they have failed in every jurisdiction in this country which
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has considered the issue under a Fourth Amendment analysis, and prevailed in only two
jurisdictions, Indiana and New Jersey, under a state constitutional analysis where the facts are
anywhere similar to this case.
Regardless of how persuaded this Court is by the minority view in Greenwood, this
Court cannot reasonably find anything in Utah's unique constitutional history which would
dictate a result different from Greenwood. A recitation of Utah Mormon pioneer polygamous
battles with federal agents is interesting, but far from relevant and convincing on the very
narrow issue before this Court. A mere substitution of a result this Court favors, without
setting forth concrete, objective, substantive, and articulable considerations, is judicially
disingenuous, and therefore, would simply subordinate the Fourth Amendment result to this
Court's personal predilections. Certainly that is no way to adopt a body of state constitutional
law which would give any guidance and direction. The Court suggests that major departures
from soundly established Fourth Amendment jurisprudence should be announced by Utah's
appellate courts, not by trial court judges.
Lastly, even if this Court were to find a heightened expectation of privacy in garbage
under a state constitutional analysis, this Court, similar to Moran v. Indiana, 625 N.E. 2d
1231,1240, would sustain the subject search. In Moran the Indiana Supreme Court applied a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule to evidence obtained during a warrantless search
of garbage put out for disposal, even though the Court later found the search violated its state
constitution. ]A Here, as there, no state court precedent addressed the constitutionality of
searches of garbage. The Indiana court held that it was reasonable for the police to conclude
that the defendants lacked a privacy interest in the garbage.
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Because the Utah Supreme Court has not directly addressed the issue of an expectation
of privacy in garbage, and no support is found in state lower court rulings to support a result
different from the federal model, the federal threshold must prevail. This Court, while
acknowledging the compelling arguments on both sides of the issue, therefore, determines that
no reasonable expectation of privacy exists as to the trash placed by Defendants in containers
owned and provided by the city, and left in the street for collection by city employees.
Neither, the Fourth Amendment, nor Article I, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution is
implicated and, therefore, no warrant was necessary to conduct the search.
IV.
DECISION
(1)

The probable cause Affidavit, filed in support of the search warrant, while arguably

containing spurious information, is not fatally flawed and a magistrate could reasonably
believe that the evidence sought would be found in the home. Accordingly, the motion to
quash the warrant is denied.
(2) The search of trash, placed in a city owned receptacle, left on the city street, with the
anticipation that it would be picked up by city employees, is not a violation of Defendants'
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Fourth Amendment rights nor in violation of Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.
THEREFORE, Defendants' Motion to Suppress is denied.

Dated at Provo, Utah, this^J? day o f / ^ / / ^ / ^ — 7 1 9 9 5 .
BY THE COURT

cc:

Thomas H. Means, Esq.
James R. Taylor, Esq.
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CARLYLE K. BRYSON, #0473
UTAH COUNTY ATTORNEY
JAMES R. TAYLOR, #3199
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY
100 East Center, Suite 2100
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 370-8026
Attorneys for the Plaintiff
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IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF UTAH, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT

STATE OF UTAH, EX PARTE,
IN THE MATTER OF:

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT
OF AND REQUEST FOR
SEARCH WARRANT

A NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION
Comes now Jerry Harper, having been duly sworn, who deposes
and states as follows:
1. I am a sergeant with the Provo Police Department. I have
been a peace officer since 1979 when I graduated from POST as the
officer with the highest academic achievement in my class. During
the time I have been a peace officer I have received over 225 hours
of specialized training for law enforcement work including 185
hours of training specific to narcotics work. Narcotics classes
include training in surveillance, operation of surveillance and
electronic investigatory equipment, field testing of drugs and drug
recognition.
As an officer I have participated in hundreds of
operations involving the undercover purchase of narcotics and/or
the arrest of persons for substance abuse related violations. I
have experience working undercover providing first hand experience
with narcotics trafficking.
I have supervised
narcotics
investigations for the Provo Police Department since 1992. I am
currently designated as the department trainer/specialist in the
areas of fingerprinting, surveillance, video equipment, narcotics
and drug recognition.
2.
home of
at 7:15
the men
money.

On April 13, 1994, several unidentified men entered the
Pat Smith and Brent Jackson at 770 South 103 3 West in Provo
a.m. without permission. According to Smith and Jackson
held them captive for several hours demanding drugs and
The men wanted to know where the drugs were.
-*%

3. On May 3, 1994, Pat Smith plead guilty to possession of
marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia in the Fourth
Circuit Court. The crimes were alleged to have occurred January
15, 1993 at the home of Linda Cannon in Orem.
4. Provo City has a solid waste collection system.

Each home

is assigned a specific can which is owned by
additional can may be obtained for an additional
week_ the cans are to be placed at curbside or in
collection. A city truck then mechanically picks
the cans.

the city.
An
fee, Once___per
the street for
up and empties

5. On June 8, in the early morning hours, I went to the home
of Pat Smith at 770 South 1033 West in Provo. There were two cans
with the number "1033" stenciled in white paint on the side in the
street in front of the house.
I took the cans to the Police
Department where I reviewed the contents. After I had finished I
replaced the garbage in the cans and returned them to the street in
front of the house.
6.
Within the cans I found marijuana stems, seeds, a
marijuana cigarette along with zig-zag papers and a small piece of
marijuana. I tested the small piece with a chemical reagent test
which indicated positive for marijuana.
7. I also found correspondence with the address of 770 South
103 3 West, Provo and the names of Pat Smith and Brent Jackson. The
correspondence included a utility bill to Brent Jackson for natural
gas. A phone bill for Brent and Pat Jackson was also located.
8. The amounts of stems, seeds and marijuana in the garbage
.imply possession of small__ ainounts_ for use.
Such amounts of
marijuana are typically packaged in bags of 1/8 ounce or less,
quite small in volume. Such bags can quickly and easily be hidden
in clothing or destroyed if notice is given of intent to search.
9. Marijuana and paraphernalia are often kept in outbuildings
and vehicles. Failure to search the curtilage of the residence
together with the person of individuals present and vehicles
located on the curtilage will likely result in officer's missing
important evidence.
10. It is my experience that most of the people I have
encountered in connection with the unlawful use of marijuana also
occasionally sell, sometimes paying for their use with profit from
sales.
It is so common as to be the rule rather than the
exception, to find evidence related to production and/or
distribution whenever marijuana is located in a residence.
11. The residence is more particularly described as a two
story duplex with tan brick and brown wood on the front. On the
side the brick extends to the eaves. There is a carport on either
side. The roof is gravel. The duplex is on the south side of 770
South and faces north.
"1033" is the west residence with the
number "1033" mounted to the right of the door as you face the
door.
12. I expect to locate additional controlled substances in the
residence together with associated paraphernalia including items
used or capable of use for the storage, use, production, or

Discovery Sent To

distribution of marijuana.
WHEREFORE, your affiant requests that a warrant be issued by
this Court authorizing a search of the residence together with the
curtilage and the person of all vehicles and individuals present
within the home and curtilage at the time of the search for the
presence of controlled substances together with associated
paraphernalia including items used or capable of use for the
storage, use, production, or distribution of marijuana to be
executed without notice of intent or authority in the daytime.
Dated this ^ T d a y of June, 199^/, jr^.m.
C^uO£^.

Affiant£/

J AAI
?

Subscribed .to and sworn before me this

F^0
day

of

1994, ££7m.

-^>is^O\
^-
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